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Introduction
In an era of heightened concern over health care
quality and patient safety on the one hand, and health
information privacy on the other, finding the right balance between these two broad goals can represent a
major policy challenge. No health issues better illustrate this challenge than the debate over use and disclosure of individualized information regarding mental
health conditions and substance use disorders.
From one perspective, knowledge about a patient’s
history of mental health or substance use condition and
treatment is vital to proper and safe treatment. Sharing
information on diagnosis, treatment, and care plans can
help promote a more comprehensive picture of a patient’s needs and reduce the risks of error by treating
providers.
From another perspective, however, disclosing or
sharing vital patient-identifiable data, even when for entirely appropriate reasons, carries significant risks as
well. These risks, however, are related to the impact on
the patient caused by the potential for misuse of information, as well as the inappropriate re-disclosure of
confidential information. In the case of mental health
conditions and substance use disorders, these risks may
include stigma, job loss, loss of occupational licensing,
the imposition of health, disability or life insurance coverage barriers, and even criminal prosecution.
This article explores the law of health information
privacy as it relates to mental health and substance use
treatment, focusing on privacy and information-sharing
in a treatment context. Although there are a considerable number of issues that arise when the purpose of
information-sharing is to protect public health or public
safety, discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of
this article.
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Even within the realm of treatment, however, the
longstanding legal challenge of finding the correct balance between privacy and disclosure has grown more
complex, as information technology advances have begun to alter the practice landscape by enabling a far
greater level of rapid information exchange regarding
health conditions, treatments, and risks. Whether and
how technology-enabled treatment should affect this
current legal landscape is our focus here.
Following an overview of the social and legal traditions underlying health information privacy, this article
examines the federal and state legal framework for information privacy relating to treatment for mental
health conditions and substance use.
The article then homes in on the distinction between
the general consent to treatment-related informationsharing standard that exists under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (‘‘HIPAA’’) Privacy
Rule and the specific consent standard that applies under federal laws governing substance use treatment information, as well as the numerous state laws that similarly apply specific consent standards to mental illness
treatment information. The article identifies some
health care scenarios that help illustrate how this tension between general and specific consent plays out in
real-world situations.
Finally, the article concludes with recommendations
for reconciling HIPAA’s general consent standard with
the specific consent standard governing mental illness
and substance use treatment.

The Social and Legal Tradition of Protecting
Health Information
Privacy is, according to Justice Brandeis, ‘‘the right to
be left alone.’’7 It is a critical part of the core belief
structure of Americans, and it is at the root of how we
operate as individuals within society.8 Americans’ concern for privacy protection dates back to the founding
of our country, and privacy is a tenet of the common
law, the very bedrock of the American legal system. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees ‘‘the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .’’9 The preamble to the
federal privacy rule promulgated pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (The
‘‘HIPAA Privacy Rule’’ or ‘‘Privacy Rule’’) recognizes
this core Constitutional right:
By referring to the need for security of ‘‘persons’’
as well as ‘‘papers and effects’’ the Fourth Amendment suggests enduring values in American law
7
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928); see also Warren, S., and Brandeis, L. ‘‘The Right to Privacy,’’ Harvard Law
Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, (Dec. 15, 1890).
8
Consider, for example, growing concerns about identity
fraud and the ease with which strangers can access another’s
personal data, either from on-line sources or from the age-old
method of sifting through discarded personal effects. See e.g.,
a 2006 survey conducted for the Markle Foundation that demonstrated that 80 percent of respondents were concerned
about identity theft, available at http://www.markle.org/
downloadable_assets/research_doc_120706.pdf, accessed on
6/6/07; see also the cases and examples listed on the Privacy
Rights
Clearinghouse
hotline,
available
at
http://
www.privacyrights.org/cases/victim.htm, accessed on 6/6/07.
9
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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that relate to privacy. The need for security of
‘‘persons’’ is consistent with obtaining patient
consent before performing invasive medical procedures. The need for security in ‘‘papers and effects’’ underscores the importance of protecting
information about the person, contained in
sources such as personal diaries, medical records,
or elsewhere.10
In sum, privacy matters deeply in American society
and law, and no aspect of privacy is more important
than the privacy of health information. In a recent national survey by the California HealthCare Foundation,
67 percent of consumers ages 18 and over expressed
being ‘‘somewhat’’ or ‘‘very’’ concerned about the privacy of their personal medical records.11 The statistics
were somewhat higher for persons who were members
of racial and ethnic minority groups (73 percent) and
comparable for persons with chronic illness (67 percent).
Within the realm of privacy concerns, there has been
a longstanding debate over whether certain types of
health information records deserve greater legal protection than others.12 In the case of information related to
sensitive topics, such as mental health conditions or
family genetic traits, unauthorized disclosures can create enormous harms, including social stigma, employment discrimination, insurance discrimination, and
other types of injuries. Accordingly, changing laws to
allow data to move more readily in the health care system may elevate the likelihood that people will not seek
care, especially preventive care.
Information related to an individual’s history of, or
treatment for, the use of alcohol and illegal or other addictive substances presents its own particular set of issues. Perhaps the most notable issue affecting patient
safety and health care quality is that fear of unauthorized disclosures can create disincentives for an individual to seek necessary treatment because of serious
concerns about possible criminal prosecution and
employment-related discrimination if health plan
claims information is obtained by the employer.13 Current and untreated substance use can also, in certain
cases, result in the forfeiture of some legal protections,
such as protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the right to receive disability benefits. Thus
10
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28,
2000); see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918,
60,008 (Nov. 3, 1999).
11
California HealthCare Foundation, National Consumer
Health Privacy Survey 2005 (available at http://www.chcf.org/
topics/view.cfm?itemID=115694; accessed on 6/6/07).
12
See e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,
82,471 (Dec. 28, 2000) in which the preamble discusses the
need for balance between and among various stakeholders.
13
As the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act indicates,
Congress passed legislation requiring the confidentiality of information related to substance and alcohol abuse treatment in
order to encourage people to seek treatment without fear of
prosecution. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-775, at 28 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2045, 2072 (explaining the confidentiality provisions in the predecessor to Section 290dd-2
were necessary because ‘‘[w]ithout that assurance, fear of public disclosure of drug abuse or of records that will attach for
life will discourage thousands from seeking the treatment they
must have if this tragic national problem is to be overcome.’’).
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individuals avoid obtaining necessary care because they
are terrified that there are not sufficient legal protections or practical steps that can be taken to assure that
unauthorized disclosure, even if illegal, can be sufficiently remedied.
In response to this heightened concern over the consequences flowing from the unauthorized disclosure of
highly sensitive information, some interest groups and
individuals argue that some types of sensitive information should receive more stringent legal protections at
the front end, since appropriate remedies at the back
end after the illegal disclosure has been made are hard
to fashion because the societal harm to the individual or
the individual’s reputation has already occurred and
cannot be erased.14
Accordingly, many state and some federal laws do afford a higher degree of protection for these specialized
categories of personal health information than is generally accorded to other types of personal health information.15 In general, these laws require the individual’s
written consent, or permission, prior to any disclosure
of certain sensitive information. Of course, laws requiring prior written permission for disclosure still raise numerous additional legal and practical issues, such as the
degree of specificity with which such written permission must be drafted, the type and quality of information that should be used in obtaining a patient’s consent
to treatment and to the disclosure of health information
to other treating providers, how long a patient’s written
permission should be considered effective before it
must be re-executed, and whether electronic signatures, or ‘‘e-signatures,’’ will suffice. Not surprisingly,
existing laws vary on some of these points.

Federal Privacy Law and the Special Status
Accorded Mental Health and Substance Use
Information
1. The Health Insurance Por tability and
Accountability Act and the Privacy Rule
Against this existing legal framework, the HIPAA
was enacted. The statute and its Privacy Rule coincided
with—and indeed were bound up in—the advent of the
era of health information technology (HIT) growth,
which many observers consider to be a potentially
transformational event in health care practice and qual14
See e.g., Testimony of Kathleen Zeitz, Nebraska Lead
Coordinator, National Breast Cancer Coalition, before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee (July
21, 2001) regarding the need for specific federal legislation
barring misuse of genetic information. Available at http://
www.natlbcc.org/bin/index.asp?strid=475&depid=3, accessed
on 6/7/07. In fact, legislation specifically aimed at prohibiting
employers and health insurers from discriminating based on
genetic information has been introduced during the last few
sessions of Congress. See e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007) and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, S. 306, 109th Cong. (2006).
15
For information on specific state law protections, see
Pritts, J., et al., The State of Health Privacy, published by the
Georgetown University Health Policy Institute, http://
www.healthprivacy.org/info-url_nocat2304/info-url_nocat.htm,
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/privacy/pdfs/statereport1.pdf, and
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/privacy/pdfs/statereport2.pdf, accessed on 6/1/07.
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ity.16 The potential of HIT has been evident for a considerable length of time. In recent years the Bush Administration has made adoption of health information
technology and national conversion from a paper medical records system to an electronic medical records system a national health policy priority through Executive
Orders and legal reforms aimed at spurring adoption
(such as incentivizing adoption through physician compensation).17 The Administration’s focus on information technology reflects its often stated belief that technology has the potential to improve quality and patient
safety while lowering costs. This belief has been given
added support by reports by the Institute of Medicine
on health care quality, which also advocated the use of
increased health information technology as a matter of
patient safety.18
HIPAA was intended to establish a legal framework
for individually identifiable health information that reconciles the need for broad information exchange with
the need for individual privacy. Provider custom, practice and discretion over many types of disclosures, bolstered by key safeguards, lie at the heart of the HIPAA
regulatory framework. HIPAA creates a federal ‘‘floor’’
of privacy protections19 while preserving ‘‘more stringent’’ state laws.20 Additionally, HIPAA does not displace other federal laws, so separate and more protective federal privacy standards must be considered in
tandem with HIPAA. It is clear that the potential for
conflicts to arise between HIPAA’s standard for recon16
Blumenthal, David, and Glaser, John, Information Technology Comes to Medicine, NEJM 356:24 2527-2534 (June 14,
2007) 2527.
17
See http://www.whitehouse.gov.news.releases/2004/04/
20040427-4.html (accessed on 7/3/04). See also The Federal
Physician Self-Referral Law (the Stark Law), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn and regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 10,053 (March 26,
2004). See also http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/10/
pr20071030a.html (accessed on 11/3/07) relating to a Medicare
demonstration effort to reward physicians for the use of electronic health records.
18
See Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A
New Health System for the 21st Century, Chapter 7 ‘‘Using Information Technology’’ (2001) and Institute of Medicine, Improving the Quality of Health Care for Mental Health and Substance Use Conditions, Quality Chasm Series, Chapters 5 & 6
(2005).
19
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) as
amended.
20
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, P.L. 104-191, Sec. 264(c)(2) (Aug. 21, 1996). ‘‘More stringent’’ was not defined in the Act, but in the implementing
regulations ‘‘more stringent’’ is defined as ‘‘in the context of a
comparison of a provision of State law and a standard [from
the HIPAA regulations], a State law that meets one or more of
the following criteria: (1) with respect to a use or disclosure,
the law prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure in circumstances under which such use or disclosure otherwise would
be permitted [under the HIPAA regulations], except if the disclosure is [required by the Secretary of HHS to determine
compliance with the HIPAA regulations] or to the individual
who is the subject of the individually identifiable health information;. . . (4) With respect to the form, substance, or the need
for express legal permission from an individual, who is the
subject of the individually identifiable health information, for
use or disclosure of individually identifiable health information, provides requirements that narrow the scope or duration,
increase the privacy protections afforded. . ., or reduce the coercive effect of the circumstances surrounding the express legal permission, as applicable.’’ 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
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ciliation of the tension between the need to further
transparency and privacy objectives and the goals of
other more protective privacy standards was recognized early in the policy process.21
The Privacy Rule applies to ‘‘covered health care entities,’’ which consist of health plans, health care clearinghouses, or health care providers who transmit any
health information in electronic form for certain administrative purposes.22 The Privacy Rule affords protections to individually identifiable health information held
by those entities, called ‘‘protected health information’’
or ‘‘PHI.’’ With very limited exceptions, the Privacy
Rule does not distinguish between types of data that are
PHI.23 As noted above, the Rule does, however, recognize that some existing federal and state privacy and
confidentiality laws accord greater protection for certain types of health information and leaves these laws
undisturbed.
In general, the Privacy Rule permits a covered entity
to use and disclose protected health information for certain core purposes, including treatment, payment and
health care operations, without an individual’s written
permission. However, the Rule also recognizes professional tradition and ethical obligation by permitting
covered entities to obtain written permission to use and
disclose health information for these core purposes
(this type of permission is called ‘‘consent’’ under the
Rule24) as part of their privacy policies. In so doing, the
Privacy Rule establishes a ‘‘general consent’’ standard
where disclosure for patient treatment is concerned. In
other words, a treating health professional can share
patient information with another treating professional
or provider without getting specific written consent. In
addition, the Rule eschews specific format or content
requirements for consent when it is utilized.
For most purposes, including payment and health
care operations, the Rule uses a ‘‘minimum necessary’’
standard to measure disclosure of protected information. This limits covered entities’ uses, disclosures, and
requests from other covered entities of protected health
information to the minimum amount necessary to ac21
Confidentiality of Individually-Identifiable Health Information: Recommendations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to section 264 of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, submitted to the
Senate’s Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the
Committee on Finance, and the House of Representatives’
Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Ways and
Means, Section J, (Sept. 11, 1997), available at: http://
www.epic.org/privacy/medical/hhs_recommendations_
1997.html, accessed on 5/22/07.
22
§ § 45 C.F.R. 160.102(a), 164.500.
23
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information at 82,621, in which the preamble discusses the
choice not to single out various types of protected health information in the text. The Privacy Rule does afford a higher degree of protection for psychotherapy notes (see note 31) generally requiring the individual’s written authorization to disclose these notes for most purposes. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
24
When a covered entity opts to obtain the patient’s permission to use or disclose PHI for the core functions of treatment, payment, or health care operations, this permission is
called ‘‘consent.’’ This is in contrast to the process for obtaining the patient’s permission to disclose PHI to a third party for
other purposes—this type of permission is called ‘‘authorization’’ and the conditions under which an authorization is valid
under the Rule are described in 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) and discussed later in the article.
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complish the intended purpose of the use or disclosure.25 However, the ‘‘minimum necessary’’ rule does
not apply to requests for or disclosures of protected
health information for treatment purposes.26 In other
words, HIPAA allows that for treatment purposes, providers can share any PHI in the patient’s medical
record.
No written authorization is needed when protected
health information is being provided to the individual
who is the subject of the information.27 In fact, disclosure to the individual himself or herself is one of only
two required disclosures (the other one is to the Secretary for purposes of auditing the covered entity for compliance). Similarly, if the individual is present and has
an opportunity to either agree or object in the case of
disclosures to family members or others involved in the
care of the individual, no written authorization is
needed.28
Moreover, the HIPAA privacy rule allows covered entities substantial flexibility to maintain their own framework for use or disclosure of PHI by establishing a series of categories for permissive disclosures. This structure facilitates the ability of health care professionals to
continue many of their existing privacy practices, thus
allowing them to develop their own approach to health
information privacy in key care areas as long as their
policies and practices are explained in writing to their
patients in advance. Covered entities may also, if they
elect to do so, use and disclose protected health information without an individual’s written permission for
certain other national priority purposes.
A few of these permissive disclosure categories are
worth mentioning briefly here. For instance, covered
entities may use and disclose protected health information without an individual’s written permission for a variety of national priority purposes including health care
oversight, public health, research, law enforcement,
and when disclosure is required by other law.29
Outside of treatment, payment, and health care operations, or the permissive exceptions noted above, the
Rule requires that entities obtain written permission
(called ‘‘authorization’’) from patients prior to the use
or disclosure of PHI.30 These authorizations must meet
specific content and format requirements. In addition,
psychotherapy notes are covered by a special authorization rule,31 even though such notes arguably relate to
25

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.508.
The Privacy Rule does however impose the minimum
necessary requirement on internal uses of protected health information, generally requiring a covered entity to identify the
individuals within their organization who need access to such
information to perform their duties and to limit their access to
the type and amount of information needed. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.514(d)(2).
27
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(2)(i).
28
45 C.F.R. § 164.510, this also includes facility directories,
for notification purposes, in limited situations when the individual is not present, and for disaster relief purposes.
29
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.
30
Interested readers can obtain from the authors a comprehensive chart summarizing HIPAA’s rules regarding mandatory and permissive disclosures, when authorizations are necessary, and what penalties attach for unauthorized disclosures.
31
‘‘Psychotherapy notes’’ are ‘‘notes recorded (in any medium) by a health care provider who is a mental health professional documenting or analyzing the contents of conversation
during a private counseling session or a group, joint, or family
counseling session and that are separated from the rest of the
26
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treatment, payment, and health care operations, and
should therefore be covered by the general consent and
disclosure rule. This is the single instance in which
HIPAA accords information greater protection than
other forms of PHI in deference to longstanding legal
and policy concerns and professional custom.
Under HIPAA, authorizations must be written in
plain language and contain:
s a specific and meaningful description of the information to be disclosed or used;
s the name or specific identification of the person(s)
authorized to disclose the information;
s the name or specific identification of the person(s)
to whom the information can be disclosed;
s a description of each purpose of the requested use
or disclosure;
s expiration date or event;
s the signature of the individual and date; and
s a few required statements to place the individual
on notice of his/her rights, including the right to revoke consent.32
In the case of routine disclosures of protected health
information to a third party who performs business
functions for a covered entity, a covered entity must enter into an agreement with the ‘‘business associate.’’33
Such agreements must include assurances that the
business associate will appropriately safeguard protected health information.34
HIPAA establishes a regulatory framework, enforced
through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s Office for Civil Rights (‘‘OCR’’), which has the
power to ensure compliance, investigate reported violations, and impose civil monetary penalties of not more
than $100 per violation, which may not exceed $25,000
per year.35 Since 2003, approximately 32,000 comindividual’s medical record. The term ‘‘psychotherapy notes’’
excludes data relating to medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session start and stop times, the modalities and
frequencies of treatment furnished, results of clinical tests, and
any summary of the following items: diagnosis, functional status, the treatment plan, symptoms, prognosis, and progress to
date.’’ 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. According to the Legal Action Center, there has been no definitive opinion from the Department
of Health and Human Services as to whether psychotherapy
notes include drug and alcohol counseling notes, or what it
means to keep a record separate from the rest of the record.
See Legal Action Center, Confidentiality and Communication:
A Guide to the Federal Drug and Alcohol Confidentiality Law
and HIPAA, Sixth Edition, at 84 (2006).
32
See 45 C.F.R § 164.508(c).
33
A business associate is a person or organization who, on
behalf of the covered entity, but ‘‘other than in the capacity of
a member of the workforce of such covered entity or arrangement’’ performs ‘‘a function or activity involving the use or disclosure of individually identifiable health information, including claims processing or administration, data analysis, processing or administration, utilization review, quality
assurance, billing, benefit management, practice management
and repricing. . .’’ or ‘‘legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting,
data aggregation, management, administrative, accreditation,
or financial services to or for such covered entity.’’ 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103.
34
45 C.F.R.§ 164.502(e).
35
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5. Penalties are more severe for wrongful disclosure, including fines of not more than $50,000, imprisonment, or both.
BNA’S HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT
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plaints have been filed with HHS OCR; of these about
8,000 were investigated, and about 5,400 (or 67 percent)
of those investigated achieved corrective action.36 No
civil fines have been assessed to date.
HIPAA does not create a federal private right of action that would permit private persons to sue covered
entities to halt disclosures or to recover damages for injuries arising from disclosures. Yet, HIPAA is viewed by
experts as establishing a standard against which health
professionals’ conduct might be measured in considering liability under other federal and state laws that do
permit private enforcement actions.
In sum, HIPAA creates a general consent protocol in
the context of treatment, payment, and health care operations. Providers can use a specific consent standard
at their option. The Privacy Rule also sets forth disclosure procedures and standards governing other circumstances. At the same time, the Rule leaves undisturbed
more stringent state laws, as well as other federal laws
that may accord greater deference to personal health
information privacy. Finally, the Rule’s own terms reflect the special status of mental health treatment and
include separate specific authorization provisions governing the disclosure of psychotherapy notes.
Thus, HIPAA is widely viewed as establishing a national code of general conduct for covered health professionals where personal health information is concerned. HIPAA leaves much discretion to health professionals themselves in fashioning this code of conduct,
while at the same time, holding them accountable for
certain disclosures that require patient authorization.

HIPAA’s Relationship to State Law

The Privacy Rule essentially establishes a ‘‘roadmap’’
for reconciling the diversity between HIPAA’s legal
standard and state law,37 which can be summarized as
follows:
First, HIPAA generally preempts state laws that are
‘‘contrary to’’ it.38 A state law is contrary to the HIPAA
Privacy Rule when it would be impossible to comply
with both the state and federal requirements or when
the provisions of the state law would be an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.39 Because HIPAA expressly permits covered
entities to make disclosures ‘‘as required’’ by other
laws,40 state laws that require disclosures (even when
HIPAA would make them optional) are not in conflict
with the federal law. Thus, under HIPAA, covered entities are permitted to comply with state mandatory disclosure laws that otherwise would appear to be preempted by federal privacy standards.
Second, HIPAA also specifies that its standards do
not supersede a contrary provision of state law, if the
provision of state law imposes requirements, standards,
or implementation specifications that are ‘‘more strin36
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/enforcement/
numbersglance.html, accessed on 12/20/07.
37
See Rosenbaum, S., Borzi, P., Burke, T., and Nath, S.,
‘‘Does HIPAA Preemption Pose a Legal Barrier to Health Information Transparency and Interoperability?’’ in Bureau of National Affairs’ Health Care Policy Report, Vol. 15, No. 11
(March 19, 2007).
38
A law that is ‘‘preempted’’ by another means that it is superseded.
39
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
40
See 45 C.F.R. 164.512(a).
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gent than’’ HIPAA’s own standards.41 As previously
noted, HIPAA sets a ‘‘floor’’ for conduct where privacy
is concerned. State laws that accord greater privacy
protections—those that either provide individuals
greater access to their own records or contain more restrictive use and disclosure requirements—are considered ‘‘more stringent than’’ HIPAA.
Third, HIPAA does not preempt state laws that provide for the reporting of various types of information,
including but not limited to, disease, injury, child abuse,
public health surveillance, investigation, or intervention, because disclosure of this type of information,
even if it is PHI, is permitted by HIPAA.42
Fourth, HIPAA does not interfere with provisions of
State law that require a health plan to report or to provide access to, information for management or financial
audits and certain other limited purposes.43
A recent review of nearly 500 judicial opinions interpreting the HIPAA privacy rule shows the great range
of questions that can arise under this roadmap outlining

the relationship between HIPAA and state laws.44 The

41

P.L. 104-191 § 264(c)(2).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1130d-7(b); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c).
43
See 42 U.S.C. § 1130d-7(c); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(d).
42
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44

See note 37, supra.

COPYRIGHT 姝 2008 BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.

HCPR

ISSN 1068-1213

7
cases considered illustrate the extent to which provider
discretion guides the question of whether to comply
with certain state disclosure laws. Some of the cases focus on the disclosure of patient health information related to mental illness and substance use, although
none of the cases relate to provider-to-provider exchange of health information for treatment reasons.

2. Special Federal Privacy Laws Applicable to
Substance Use Treatment and Mental Health
In addition to HIPAA, several federal laws pertain directly to the disclosure of mental illness and substance
use information. These laws are set forth in Figure 1
and are discussed in greater detail below.

Figure 1: Comparison of Key Federal Laws’ Consent Requirements for
Disclosures of Individually Identifiable Information
42 C.F.R. Part 2
(Alcohol and Drug Use
Provisions of the Federal
Confidentiality of Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Patient
Records law)
No consent needed for Specific consent needed
Type of Patient Autreatment, payment, or for disclosures, (includthorization or Consent Required for Use health care operations ing for treatment, paypurposes
ment, health care operaor Disclosure for
tions purposes)
Treatment, Payment
or Health Care Operations Purposes
Name of Privacy Law
or Regulation

HIPAA Privacy Rule

a. Federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Patient Records
Since the early 1970s, patient records for alcohol and
drug use treatment have been entitled to special
provider/patient confidentiality protections as a matter
of federal law.45 These laws have important implications for the electronic exchange of health information
data. The Federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Patient Records law, reflecting Congressional
concern about the stigmatizing and legal implications
of seeking alcohol and drug treatment,46 creates a virtual shield against the disclosure of personal health information related to alcohol and substance-related conditions and treatment. Its implementing regulations47
have become such a staple of the legal landscape that
45
The Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act (21 U.S.C. 1175), was transferred to section 527 of the
Public Health Service Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 290ee-3 and
then later transferred to § 290dd-2. The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4582) was amended and transferred to section 523 of the Public Health Service Act, codified
at 42 U.S.C. 290dd-3 and eventually omitted, presumably because confidentiality for alcohol treatment was eventually
bundled with confidentiality for substance use treatment.
46
Kamoie, B., and Borzi, P. ‘‘A Crosswalk Between the Final HIPAA Privacy Rule and Existing Federal Substance Abuse
Confidentiality Requirements,’’ Double Issue Brief #18-19,
Center for Health Services Research and Policy, The George
Washington University School of Public Health and Health
Services (2001) at 17.
47
42 C.F.R. Part 2. The original statutes are still included as
full text in the beginning of 42 C.F.R. Part 2, at §§ 2.1 and 2.2.
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FERPA

Medicaid

Specific consent
needed for disclosures
of educational records
for medical purposes

Unclear (no specific
federal ruling or official
interpretation in wake
of HIPAA; appears to be
widely understood as
relying on a more traditional approach of requiring specific consent
to disclose rather than
using the general consent standard found in
HIPAA)

they are known simply as ‘‘Part 2’’ of the broader body
of federal substance use regulations of which they are a
part.48
With certain conditions and exceptions, Part 2 strictly
prohibits the disclosure and use of drug and alcohol use
records maintained in connection with the performance
of any federally assisted alcohol and drug use program.49 Disclosure in this instance means ‘‘a communi48
The regulations for Part 2 were originally proposed in
1974 as an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (39 Fed.
Reg. 30,426 (Aug. 22, 1974); proposed jointly by the Department of Health Education, and Welfare and the Special Action
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention in 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 20,521
(May 9, 1975); promulgated in final form later that same year
(40 Fed. Reg. 27,801 (July 1, 1975). They were substantively
updated during the 1980s (45 Fed. Reg. 53 (Jan. 2, 1980), 48
Fed. Reg. 38,758 (Aug. 25, 1983), and 52 Fed. Reg. 21,796
(June 9, 1987)) and clarified slightly in the mid-1990s (59 Fed.
Reg. 42,561 (Aug. 18, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 45,063 (Aug. 31,
1994), 60 Fed. Reg. 22,296 (May 5, 1995)).
49
42 C.F.R. § 2.3(a). Note that federal assistance is defined
very broadly, and includes being (1) conducted in whole or in
part by any U.S. department or agency; (2) licensed, certified,
registered or otherwise authorized by any U.S. department or
agency (including being certified with provider status under
the Medicare program or being authorized to conduct methadone maintenance treatment or being registered to dispense
controlled substances; (3) supported by funds provided by any
U.S. department or agency, including as a recipient of federal
financial assistance in any form (not limited to the provision of
substance abuse or alcohol treatment), conducted by a state or
local government that receives federal funds that could be
used for alcohol or drug abuse treatment, or is assisted by the
IRS through the allowance of contributions as tax deductions
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cation of patient identifying information, the affirmative
verification of another person’s communication of patient identifying information, or the communication of
any information from the record of a patient who has
been identified.’’50 Patient-identifying information includes many types of information, such as names, addresses, Social Security numbers, fingerprints, photographs, or ‘‘similar information by which the identity of
a patient can be determined with reasonable accuracy
and speed either directly or by reference to other publicly available information.’’51 Criminal penalties for
violations include a fine of not more than $500 for first
offenses and not more than $5,000 for each subsequent
offense.52
Part 2 sweeps broadly in defining both patients and
programs, as described below. Its provisions are stringent, prohibiting disclosure of any information53 that
could either directly or indirectly identify an individual
as an alcohol or substance use patient.54
Part 2 applies to programs, which are defined as:
s individuals or entities (other than general medical
facilities), or identified units within general medical facilities that hold themselves out as providing,
and actually provide alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment; or
s medical personnel or other staff in a general medical care facility whose primary function is the provision of alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment and who are identified as such providers.55
Part 2 also uses the term ‘‘patient’’ broadly to include
‘‘any individual who has applied for or been given a diagnosis or treatment for alcohol or drug abuse at a federally assisted program and includes any individual
who, after arrest on a criminal charge, is identified as
an alcohol or drug abuser in order to determine eligibility to participate in a program.’’56
Importantly, all permissible disclosures under Part 2
of drug and alcohol use records maintained in connection with the performance of any federally assisted alcohol and drug use program are limited to ‘‘that information which is necessary to carry out the purpose of
the disclosure.’’57 While Part 2 prohibits the use of covered information to form the basis of a criminal
charge,58 the law does require disclosure in response to
or the granting of tax-exempt status to the program. 42 C.F.R.
§ 2.12(b). There are special exceptions for information on alcohol and drug use patients maintained in connection with the
Department of Veterans Affairs and other limits for information obtained by the Armed Forces. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c).
50
42 C.F.R. § 2.11.
51
Id.
52
42 C.F.R. §§ 2.3 (b)(3), 2.4.
53
42 C.F.R. § 2.12(d).
54
See Kamoie and Borzi, supra note 46, at 17. See also 42
C.F.R. § 2.11 et seq.
55
42 C.F.R. § 2.11. For clarification, this means that a physician in a hospital emergency room who makes a drug use diagnosis occasionally would not be considered a ‘‘program’’ unless substance abuse diagnosis and treatment is his primary
function and he is identified specifically as that type of provider.
56
42 C.F.R. § 2.11.
57
42 C.F.R. § 2.13(a).
58
Id.
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a subpoena issued as part of an ongoing court procedure pursuant to an authorizing court order.59
Nearly all disclosures under Part 2 require specific
patient consent,60 and the content and format of consent must meet the federal standards described below.
In contrast, the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not require
any consent to disclose protected health information for
treatment, payment, or health care operations purposes. If a provider elects to obtain such consent, s/he is
permitted under HIPAA to use a general consent form.
Thus, Part 2’s ‘‘specific consent’’ format sets a far
higher bar than HIPAA with respect to consent requirements.
The required elements of a Part 2 consent form are:
s the specific name or designation of the program or
person permitted to make the disclosure;
s the name or title of the individual or the name of
the organization to which the disclosure is made;
s the name of the patient;
s the purpose of the disclosure;
s how much and what kind of information is to be
disclosed;
s the signature of the patient (or if a minor or incompetent or deceased, then the signature of a person
authorized to give consent);
s the date the consent is signed;
s a statement that the consent is subject to revocation at any time except to the extent the discloser
has acted in reliance;
s the date, event, or condition upon which the consent will expire, if not revoked before;61 and
s a statement that the information being disclosed
may not be re-disclosed without the individual’s
consent.62
Part 2’s restrictions on disclosure of drug and alcohol
use records maintained in connection with the performance of any federally assisted alcohol and drug use
program allow certain exceptions, the most pertinent of
which for our purposes are (1) communications within
a program or between a program and an entity having
direct administrative control over that program;63 and
59
42 C.F.R. § 2.61. Nonetheless, before a court may issue
such an order, it must give notice to the patient and the treatment program, follow fact-finding procedures, and limit the
disclosure to necessary information. 42 C.F.R. § 2.64.
60
Part 2 does not distinguish between ‘‘consent’’ and ‘‘authorization,’’ like HIPAA does. Accordingly, we use the term
consent when discussing Part 2 to mirror its regulations. For a
complete list of when covered entities can disclose protected
health information, with or without authorization, please contact the authors for a chart which summarizes the allowable
disclosures in significant detail and explains the purpose of
each disclosure, whether or not it is mandatory or permissive,
who is the protected party, who makes the disclosure, to whom
the disclosure can be made, what types of consent are needed,
and what penalties attach.
61
42 C.F.R. § 2.31.
62
42 C.F.R. § 2.32.
63
This means that communications of information between
or among personnel having a need for the information in connection with their duties arising out of the provision of diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment of alcohol or drug use
do not fall under Part 2 if the communications are within a program or between a program and entity that has direct admin-
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(2) communications between a program and a qualified
service organization (‘‘QSO’’).64 These exceptions allow programs covered by Part 2 some operational leeway with respect to health information exchange.
QSO arrangements are similar to business associate
arrangements under HIPAA, but QSOs that furnish
medical care are subject to Part 2 as health care providers. Thus, medical QSOs that are also covered entities
under HIPAA are bound both by HIPAA (which contains certain unique safeguards such as granting individuals access to their own health records) and the
more specific consent requirements of Part 2.65
Part 2 defines certain limited circumstances under
which disclosures can be made without patient consent,
including medical emergencies, research activities and
audit or evaluation activities.66 Re-disclosures (i.e., secondary disclosures stemming from an initial one) are
prohibited unless made back to the program from
which the information was obtained.67
As with HIPAA, Part 2 sets a federal privacy floor,
preempting state laws that are less protective regarding
disclosures of drug and alcohol use records, while saving state laws that would be interpreted as being more
stringent.68
There have been few legal challenges involving the
interpretation of Part 2, most likely because its prohibitions are both broad and relatively clear, and because
the programs covered by Part 2 (i.e., federally assisted
substance use and alcohol treatment providers) have a
strong tradition of non-disclosure. Part 2 has such traction that even the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations and most state licensing
agencies have explicit requirements regarding substance use and alcohol treatment record confidentiality
and facility compliance with Part 2.69
istrative control over the program. 42 C.F.R § 2.12(c)(3). In effect, programs can ‘‘report up’’ to entities with direct administrative control (e.g., parts of an integrated system that oversee
the alcohol or drug use treatment program).
64
A qualified service organization is defined as a person—
i.e., an individual, partnership, corporation, federal, state or local government agency, or any other legal entity—that ‘‘provides services to a program, such as data processing, bill collecting, dosage preparation, laboratory analyses, or legal,
medical, accounting or other professional services, or services
to prevent or treat child abuse or neglect, including training on
nutrition and child care and individual and group therapy’’ and
‘‘has entered into a written agreement with a program.’’ 42
C.F.R. § 2.11. The written agreement must include an acknowledgment that in receiving, storing, processing, or otherwise
dealing with any patient records from the programs, the person is fully bound by Part 2 and if necessary will resist in judicial proceedings any efforts to obtain access to patient records
except as provided for by Part 2. Id.
65
See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, ‘‘The Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records Regulation and the
HIPAA Privacy Rule: Implications for Alcohol and Substance
Abuse Programs,’’ at 2 (June 2004).
66
See 42 C.F.R. Subpart D, ‘‘Disclosures without Patient
Consent.’’
67
See 42 C.F.R. § 2.52(b); see also 42 C.F.R. § 2.53(d).
68
42 C.F.R. § 2.20.
69
Jade, R. ‘‘The Secret Life of 42 CFR Part 2,’’ 30-APR
Champion 34 at FN 12 (2006).
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b. The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of
1974

Enacted in 1974, the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 197470 (‘‘FERPA’’) protects the privacy of
student education records and represents a ‘‘response
to what Congress saw as growing evidence of abuse of
student records in the United States.’’71 FERPA serves
two functions: (1) to create a right of access to student
records for parents and students; and (2) to protect the
privacy of those records by preventing unauthorized access by third parties.72 FERPA has been substantively
amended numerous times and its implementing regulations are comprehensive.73
FERPA prohibits the release of education records
without parental consent, or, in the case of students age
18 or older or attending college, without the consent of
the student.74 FERPA applies to all public or private
educational agencies, at the elementary, secondary, and
higher education level that receive federal education
funding.75 The range of information considered protected records under FERPA is broad and can include
information related to the treatment of a specific student for substance use or mental health conditions.
Under FERPA, any recorded information maintained
by an educational agency or institution or by a party
acting for the agency or institution constitutes a
‘‘record’’ under FERPA, with a few exceptions.76 This
means that treatment records can be records protected
under FERPA. Under FERPA, student records are
records, files, documents, and other materials which
contain information directly related to a student and are
maintained by an educational agency or institution or
by a person acting for such agency or institution.77
Records of both current and former students are covered.78 For a record to be protected by FERPA, it must
contain ‘‘personally identifiable’’ information about a
student.79
Although FERPA protects health records if maintained by educational agencies, such as those kept by
school-based clinics, it also permits certain disclosures
70

20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. Instruction, 463 F. 3d 719, 730 (7th Cir. 2006).
72
Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University, 294 N.W. 2d
228, 231 (1980); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 39,858, 39, 862-39863
(Dec. 13, 1974); 121 Cong. Rec. 7974 (May 13, 1975); Rios v.
Read, 73 F.R.D. 589, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). It should also be
noted that FERPA was enacted as a floor amendment to other
educational legislation, without intensive floor debate or other
Congressional deliberations on its specific provisions. See
Daggett, L., ‘‘Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work,’’ 46 Cath. U.L. Rev. 617 (1997).
73
See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. Part 99.
74
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d).
75
See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1.
76
See id. These exceptions include ‘‘sole possession’’ notes,
law enforcement notes, or those made by physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, etc. in an institution of postsecondary
education. This is significant for a few reasons. It means that
for certain health records, including mental health records—
albeit only those relating to students over age 18—parents cannot use FERPA to gain access to their children’s records. Additionally, this exception to the definition of record also means
that such health and mental health treatment records are left
to other federal and state laws for protection.
77
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
78
See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
79
See id.
71
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regarding substance use and mental health conditions
unless prohibited under more stringent and protective
state law. FERPA also provides for a set of circumstances in which disclosures without consent are allowed.80
Accordingly, FERPA is similar in structure to HIPAA,
requiring written consent for certain disclosures but allowing certain others to be made without consent. Specifically of interest to this analysis, parental or (where
appropriate) student consent is required to release educational records involving medical treatment.
Finally, it should also be noted that records covered
by FERPA are not subject to HIPAA because HIPAA’s
definition of protected health information specifically
excludes FERPA records.81 This means that unlike Part
2, HIPAA and FERPA do not overlap. Thus FERPA adds
an extra layer to federal health information law and the
policy protections regarding confidentiality of
records.82

c. Medicaid Privacy Statute

The Medicaid privacy statute is a precursor to
HIPAA—its provisions bear a striking resemblance to
the basic HIPAA rule, yet HHS has never issued a formal interpretation that would align Medicaid privacy
standards squarely with the HIPAA Privacy Rule. This
lack of action by HHS has created a fair amount of confusion.
Federal Medicaid law requires state plans for medical
assistance to provide safeguards that restrict use and
disclosure of patient information to purposes directly
connected with administration of the plan.83 Implementing regulations84 further define the purposes directly related to plan administration to include: establishing eligibility, determining the amount of medical
assistance, providing services for recipients, and conducting or assisting investigations, prosecutions, or legal proceedings related to the administration of the
plan.85
In addition, the regulations require agencies to establish criteria for safeguarding specific information about
applicants and recipients, including at least names, addresses, medical services provided, social and economic
80
A notable exception is that of emergency situations, if the
information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the
student or others. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(b)(1)(I). For a complete list of allowable disclosures without consent, see 20
U.S.C. § 1232g.
81
See 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 at 82,621 (Dec. 28, 2000) for the
HIPAA preamble comments regarding the exclusion of FERPA
records from HIPAA.
82
The most current analysis of FERPA and HIPAA is the
study of the Virginia Tech shootings and the care Seung Hui
Cho received, the information that was disclosed, the information that was kept confidential, and the decisions made by his
university and health care providers throughout his college
tenure. Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007, available at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index.html, accessed on 8/31/07. The Virginia Tech Review Panel reported
about the reach of HIPAA and FERPA and how perceptions of
these privacy laws and fears of noncompliance often cause entities to default to nondisclosure, even when legally they are
able to make disclosures. Id. at 63. It should be noted that the
secrecy shrouding Cho’s care neither helped him get proper
treatment nor helped integrate him into society.
83
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(7).
84
42 C.F.R. §§ 431.300-431.307.
85
42 C.F.R. § 431.302.
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conditions and circumstances, agency evaluations of
personal information, medical data, including diagnosis
and history of disease or disability, information received for verifying income eligibility and amount of
medical assistance payments, and information received
in connection with the identification of legally liable
third party resources.86
The regulations also require agencies to have criteria
specifying conditions for release and use of information
about applicants and recipients.87 Access to information concerning applicants or recipients must be restricted to individuals who are subject to standards of
confidentiality that are comparable to those of the
agency.88 With certain exceptions, the regulations also
require permission from a family or individual, wherever possible, before an agency can respond to an information request from an outside source.89 Additionally,
agencies must have data exchange agreements (similar
to HIPAA business associate agreements) in order to
exchange data with other agencies.90
Thus, as with HIPAA, the Medicaid statute outlines a
basic floor of privacy and the use of formal protocols to
guide data disclosures. Unlike HIPAA, Medicaid does
not appear to address patient consent to disclosure in
the context of treatment, payment, and health care operations as a general rule, but instead appears, like
FERPA and Part 2, to rely on the more traditional approach of requiring specific patient consent for disclosures of personally identifiable information.

State Privacy Laws Governing Mental Health and
Substance Use
A detailed survey of state privacy laws is beyond the
scope of this article. However, as of 2002, fifty (50)
states91—including the District of Columbia and excluding Arkansas—had specific statutes related to some aspect of mental health privacy in one or more settings.
The Institute of Medicine’s report, Improving the Quality of Health Care for Mental and Substance-Use Conditions, categorizes state laws governing mental health
records into four types that govern patient records
maintained: (1) in mental hospitals or mental health
programs; (2) by mental health practitioners; (3) on behalf of patients who are involuntarily committed to
mental institutions; or (4) on behalf of all patients receiving mental health treatment of any kind and in any
setting.92 Additionally, as of 2002, 36 states had specific
laws pertaining to information privacy in one or more
contexts for information related to substance use. With
the exception of West Virginia, all state laws addressed
the question of the privileged legal status of provider/
patient communications involving either substance use
or mental health information.
Many state laws were enacted prior to HIPAA; as a
result, they do not use the same terms and nomencla86

42 C.F.R. § 431.305.
42 C.F.R.§ 431.306(a).
88
42 C.F.R. § 431.306(b).
89
42 C.F.R. § 431.306(d).
90
42 C.F.R. § 431.306(f).
91
See Pritts, Joy, et al., The State of Health Privacy, supra
note 15.
92
See Jost, T.S., ‘‘Constraints on Sharing Mental Health
and Substance Use Treatment Information Imposed by Federal
and State Medical Record Privacy Laws,’’ Appendix B to Improving the Quality of Health Care for Mental and SubstanceUse Conditions, supra note 18.
87
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ture as the Privacy Rule, which is structured to allow information disclosures for treatment, payment, and
health care operations. The fact that state laws frequently use terms that differ fundamentally from
HIPAA adds to the complexity of the analysis.

Applying Federal and State Law to ‘‘Real World’’
Scenarios of Treatment for Mental Health
Conditions and Substance Use Disorders
The prior discussion underscores an overarching and
critical difference between the Privacy Rule and the
other federal laws related to mental health and substance use treatment, as well as state privacy laws,
namely, the difference in the nature of consent required
to authorize disclosure. HIPAA uses a general consent
standard covering health information exchanges related to treatment, payment and health care operations.
In contrast, Part 2, FERPA and many state laws require
specific consent for disclosures of identifiable health information in a treatment context. So how are these differing standards reconciled at the point of delivery of a
health care service, given the legal complexity of health
information law in the context of mental health and
substance use treatment?
To aid in thinking about these issues, we have, in
consultation with provider experts in the field, developed several scenarios illustrating how current law applies to the exchange of data regarding alcohol treatment and substance use for treatment, payment, and
health care operations. We discuss these in greater detail in a longer version of this article which will be released in 2008.93 However, this article briefly examines
one of those scenarios: what happens when there is a
medical emergency.

Release of records for bona fide medical
emergencies
䊳

A woman who presents unconscious to the emergency room from a car accident with multiple
fractures, including a pelvic fracture, and requires
surgery. Her daughter, who is accompanying her,
explains to the emergency room physician that
she believes that her mother has been prescribed
a long-acting opiate antagonist to treat her alcohol dependence. If this is indeed the case, her
mother may not respond to the normal course of
analgesics and could be under-treated in the
emergency room for pain stemming from the fractures. She would need to be given an alternate analgesic that would work, despite the opiate antagonist. Therefore, the emergency room doctor
needs to know exactly what medication she has
been taking, and how recently the medication to
treat her alcohol dependence was administered.
The physician calls the substance use treatment
program (which is not a part of the health system
that houses the emergency room) to determine
the dosage prescribed and other information regarding prescribed timing of her medication, as

93
The longer version of this article can be found at http://
www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/healthpolicy/chsrp/publications.cfm.
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well as her history of compliance with taking
medications.

In this scenario the patient is unconscious and in an
emergency situation. The stakes are therefore fairly
high and time is of the essence.
Under HIPAA, consent is not necessary for one physician to disclose protected health information to another in emergencies or for that matter, in the normal
course of treatment.94 Therefore, HIPAA would not bar
disclosure in this instance.
As for Part 2, the first question would be whether the
regulations even apply. If we assume the substance use
treatment program receives some form of federal funding, which is likely, Part 2 would apply. In medical
emergencies, Part 2 allows for the disclosure of patient
identifying information without patient consent under
certain conditions. 42 C.F.R. § 2.51(a) allows disclosures to be made to medical personnel who have a need
for information about a patient, for the purpose of treating a condition which poses an immediate threat to the
health of any individual, and which requires immediate
medical intervention.
In this scenario, the substance use treatment program would be permitted to disclose patient identifying
information to medical personnel (i.e., the doctor in the
emergency room) who need to know certain information about the patient. The information would be disclosed to treat a condition that poses an immediate
threat to the patient—the pain from the multiple
fractures—which requires immediate medical intervention. Of course, the disclosure would be limited, as all
under Part 2 are, to information which is necessary to
carry out the purpose of the disclosure and nothing
more.
Part 2 imposes an additional requirement on disclosures made under these circumstances. In the emergency situation described above, receiving patient consent prior to making the disclosure to the medical staff
is not necessary, reflecting the foresight the Part 2
drafters had in recognizing that requiring consent in
bona fide medical emergencies could result in difficulty
or poorer outcomes. In the case of an unconscious patient or in an instance in which time is of the essence,
requiring consent would be either impossible or could
take valuable minutes away from emergency treatment.
However, Part 2 does require written documentation in
the patient record immediately following the disclosure.
This requirement ensures that there is a written record
of every emergency-related disclosure made without
the patient’s written consent. Under Part 2, written
documentation in the patient record must consist of:
s the name of the medical personnel to whom disclosure was made and his/her affiliation with any
health care facility;
s the name of the individual making the disclosure;
s the date and time of the disclosure; and
94
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b), in which consent ‘‘may’’ be
obtained and § 164.506(c), in which a covered entity may use
or disclose protected health information for treatment (without
consent).
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s the nature of the emergency (or error if the report
was to the FDA).95
Because of the emergency nature of this scenario,
many state laws will likely allow such disclosures without consent as well, but that will depend on the specifics of the state law. For example, California law permits
disclosure of information related to alcohol and substance use treatment without the patient’s written consent to medical persons to ‘‘meet a bona fide emergency.’’96 Health systems would need to engage in a
preemption analysis to determine whether state laws
are stricter than HIPAA and Part 2, and if so, would
need to follow the course of action most protective of
the patient’s information. Determining when a situation
presents a legitimate emergency that warrants disclosure may be difficult. However, requests for information from emergency rooms would most likely qualify,
permitting disclosure to occur.
In many respects, the scenario described above involving emergency treatment may be an easier one to
understand and reconcile the various legal standards
than others, because at every step of the process when
a life is in the balance, overall policy typically favors
disclosure to avert adverse health consequences.
However, reconciling competing legal standards and
approaches when disclosure relating to mental health
services and substance use treatment information is for
the purpose of health care quality assessment and utilization management may raise more complex issues.
For example, if the medical director of a Medicaid managed care organization (MCO) furnishing both physical
and behavioral health care wanted to compare the quality of substance abuse treatment services furnished by
network providers or evaluate use patterns for purposes
of utilization management, HIPAA would allow the
MCO to obtain all records as a health care operation
matter, subject to the ‘‘minimum necessary’’ standard.
But as an entity subject to Part 2, the MCO would also
be bound by Part 2 and by any applicable state laws.
Arguably in this instance, the MCO would maintain
direct control of its network pursuant to its contractual
obligations to the plan. Accordingly, the Part 2 operational exception would apply,97 as well as the Part 2 audit and evaluation exception. Under this exception,
identifiable information regarding substance use treatment or mental health services can be disclosed to persons performing the audit or evaluation on behalf of:
s government agencies that provide financial assistance to or regulate a program;
s private entities that provide financial assistance or
third party premium payments to a program;
s quality improvement or peer review organizations
performing a utilization or quality control review;
or
s someone who is determined by the program director to be qualified to conduct the audit or evaluation.98
But if the physical health and behavioral health care
were furnished through separate corporate structures
(e.g., an MCO and a managed behavioral health organi95

42 C.F.R. § 2.51(b).
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11845.5.
97
See 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(3).
98
See 42 C F. R. § 2.53.
96
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zation (‘‘MBHO’’)), the MBHO could not disclose data
to the MCO without the specific consent of the patients
under its care. In this situation, the overall management
of co-occurring conditions might be significantly impaired, as would overall utilization review and quality
assurance activities. The need for specific consent covering health information held by a Part 2 provider
would also prevent a primary care provider from obtaining information about a patient’s mental illness or
addiction treatment, unless the treatment were received
from the same health care entity furnishing the primary
care (i.e., a community health center with an addiction
treatment program).

Recommendations
This article discusses how key differences in health
information privacy standards can affect the sharing of
information (whether manually or electronically) related to mental illness and addiction treatment. What is
generally disclosable for treatment-related purposes
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule is subject to a far stricter
specific consent standard under Part 2 and other federal and state laws. The justification for this higher
standard—avoidance of stigma, potential employment
discrimination and prosecutorial exposure that come
with the revelation of such highly sensitive
information—remains as strong today as it did when
heightened privacy protections were first adopted. On
the other hand, much more is known about the importance of having access to complete and accurate information about any existing conditions, prior treatment,
medications and medical history of the patient to assure
safe, high quality and effective patient treatment.
To that end, three recommendations are worthy of
consideration to assist in reconciling the tension between full disclosure and patient privacy. These steps
will help to advance the dialogue and ensure that the
benefits of technology-enabled information directly relevant to the quality and safety of patient care do not
elude persons with mental illness or substance use conditions.

Recommendation 1: Use Technology’s Capabilities to
Standardize and Operationalize a Specific Consent
System

With the advent of electronic data systems, arguably
the potential for violations of the right to privacy is
greater now than ever before because individually identifiable data moves more easily electronically. At the
same time, however, technology-enabled information
can improve the likelihood of higher quality and safer
care, particularly for patients with complex medical
needs, because of the existence of more complete information about a patient’s condition and course of treatment.
Thus to ensure the benefits of technology reach individuals with mental health and substance use conditions while ensuring privacy of sensitive medical information, greater emphasis should be placed on technology designs that enable specific, secure consent to the
disclosure of personal information for treatment and
quality assurance purposes. In other words, the emphasis has to decisively shift away from a relaxation or
‘‘harmonization’’ of standards and toward systems that
can operate on a specific consent standard.
Current and developing technology should be capable of supporting such a system. For example, fire-
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walls can be established that would protect information
that must be kept private under Part 2. In addition, decision support pop-ups for elements of consent can be
included in data systems to assist providers in following
the necessary steps for obtaining consent. Indeed, it is
through a specific focus on the adaptation of technology to support solutions that are capable of accommodating both the elements of a specific consent and a
general consent standard that this apparent inconsistency can be resolved without having to face the profoundly more contentious question of whether specific
consent standards should give way.

Recommendation 2: Ensure that Patient’s Decision to
Withhold Health Information from Other Treating
Providers is Truly ‘‘Informed.’’
Much of the focus in specific consent statutes is on
the importance of shielding information that is the subject of a specific consent. In our view, far less attention
has been placed on ensuring that a decision by a patient
undergoing mental health or substance use treatment to
withhold information from other treating health professionals is truly informed. An informed consent must
rest on full information and enable the patient to understand the material risks and benefits associated with a
course of conduct. Withholding consent to the release
of personal health information to a patient’s other treating health professionals when that information will be
used only for the purpose of enabling other treating
providers to best assure safety and quality carries significant risks. To be sure, in a health emergency even
specific consent statutes can be overridden. But an
equally great concern may be the withholding of important health information from a patient’s treating primary health care professionals or specialists, especially
diagnostic information or information about a particular course of therapy related to mental illness or addition. In an age of patient empowerment, it is essential
that patients fully understand the nature of the special
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privacy shield that applies to data about mental illness
and addiction and that they be counseled impartially
and carefully regarding their right to specifically consent to the sharing of such information in certain circumstances.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen the Tools of
Enforcement for Violations of Privacy

Individuals may become more secure with a broader
approach toward approved information sharing if they
know that the sanctions for violations for re-disclosure
of controlled information are swift and serious. Remedies for unauthorized re-disclosures or misuse of confidential information might include steep penalties
(e.g., significant fines, debarment from participation in
federal or state health care programs, suspension of licensure) for health professionals who re-disclose for
any purpose other than the purpose covered by the consent.

Conclusion
These recommendations require significant follow-up
by policymakers, health care providers, agency administrators, those who design information technology, and
health care regulators.
This much is clear, however: first, that mental health
and substance use treatment should not be excluded
from the potential benefits and transformational power
of technology-enabled health care; second, that a specific consent standard does not have to—and should not
be permitted to—operate as a barrier to such a transformation given the potential of technology adaptation;
and third, that through operational design, a commitment to genuine informed consent, and provider accountability if the limits of patient-controlled consent
are exceeded, it may be possible to reconcile the important goals of protecting the privacy of personal health
information and improving health information transparency for the critical purposes of quality improvement and health disparities reduction.
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